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**1961/05/31**

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Executive Registry
61-4507

JFK

Date 12-5-90HRP 89-2

31 May 1961

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

PART I of report on trip to L/A. (I visited Mexico, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela only.) This part of the report makes recommendations as follows:

- I. Strengthen present efforts to collect intelligence on Communist China in certain Latin American countries.
- II. Strengthen [redacted] arrangements with the [redacted]  
[redacted]
- III. Study the desirability of sending a small team to B-A to brief officers of the [redacted] on techniques of counterintelligence, counterespionage, countersabotage and subversion and irregular warfare.
- IV. Study the desirability of inviting more [redacted]  
[redacted] to visit the US.

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V. Strengthen agency representation in [REDACTED]

VI. Develop a channel [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Now in  
train.)

*Sherman Kent*

SHERMAN KENT  
Assistant Director  
National Estimates

*Copies to*

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I. South America as an Important Area for the Collection of Information Regarding Communist China.

1. As is well known Communist China is very busy in Latin America. Likewise, but perhaps not so generally well known, is the fact that a large number of Latin Americans have been invited to visit China. By no means have all the invitees been communists or extreme left wingers. Both FE and WH divisions, DDP, are aware of intelligence collection opportunities afforded by these visits. My recommendation is that the [REDACTED] activities in Latin America be beefed up. More precisely I recommend:

(a) A first rate substantive man be told off for TDY visits to all of the Latin American stations with [REDACTED] potential. The object of his visit at each station would be to bring relevant station personnel up to date on the situation in China, to discuss fully requirements, possible methods of pre-briefing travellers, and, where feasible, give guidance at the debriefing and reporting stages. In my book the man to do this must be one who has lived with the substantive side of Communist China, who knows where existing intelligence collection systems are strong and weak, and who will be an articulate and imaginative briefer of station personnel.

(b) I am thinking in terms of such a man's taking a swing through the appropriate stations, stopping a few days in each and returning to Headquarters. I am thinking that he might make two or three such trips each year. He should, of course, have enough time at Headquarters to report and make recommendations and to refresh himself with respect to new developments in China.

(c) The kind of man I have in mind is much more likely to be found among fairly senior grade DDI analysts than elsewhere in the Agency.

## II. Beefing Up Present

1. [redacted] with the [redacted] Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence organizations, and the [redacted] Police, is presently conducted in very large measure by [redacted] of the [redacted]. He is, of course, backed up by a small group of technical people working outside the embassy. Whatever the functions of this group it would appear to me that [redacted] alone carries the [redacted]. I have seldom encountered an abler, harder working, or more devoted officer of the Agency. He has a splendid personal relationship with the command echelons of these [redacted]. His Spanish is almost as good as his English.

2. The [redacted], I should imagine to be hands down the best in Latin America. I spent a good amount of time with all of them and came away with a high regard for the quality of the officers and their professionalism. I believe that the principal [redacted] target of all of the services is the [redacted] Communist Party membership, its apparatus, and its hangers on. The second target for the [redacted] and the

military intelligence agencies is the general range of foreign positive intelligence relating to neighboring states. In a couple of discussions regarding the situations in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] I was well impressed by the amount that these people knew and the cautious and balanced way they gave their judgment. What they had to say was plainly based on good reporting and carried with it a tone of cool authority.

3. In my view there is much more ore in these organizations than one man can hope to handle. [REDACTED] secretary's command of Spanish is very elementary).

4. With all deference I would recommend that [REDACTED] be assigned a bright bilingual junior officer and a secretary whose Spanish was adequate for authoritative translation both ways. I further recommend that Headquarters furnish [REDACTED] on a trial basis with the best Latin American articles appearing in [REDACTED] version of the Weekly and, if possible, that these be translated into Spanish here at Headquarters. If this recommendation is acted upon we should probably embark upon it on an experimental basis. My guess is that we are not likely to get a great amount of written material in exchange. A more likely result would be conversations and oral reports which [REDACTED] would have to reduce to writing. Plainly, he is not going to be able to do this without some additional help.

III. Interest of the [REDACTED] in Irregular Warfare, Counterintelligence, Counterespionage, and Counter-sabotage.

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1. At a visit to the [REDACTED], [REDACTED], made the point that unnamed components of the US Government presently did some briefing of Latin American service attachés on these subjects while these officers were on duty in Washington. He indicated that these briefings were being conducted pretty much on an individual basis and that there were a great many officers in the [REDACTED] who were tremendously interested in these briefings. He wondered about the feasibility of the Agency or other parts of the US Government sending a little briefing team to [REDACTED] to give a course of instruction in these matters. As I have noted elsewhere, the [REDACTED] struck me as a quite brisk professional outfit manned by a good group of officers. Their principal intelligence chore is somewhat out of the ordinary; it seems to consist not merely in identifying and watching local communists, but also in engaging them on the streets and endeavoring to beat their



brains out. No question but that instruction in the tricks of this trade would find an enthusiastic audience. I recommend that this subject be given some study. Perhaps USIB could profitably discuss it.

IV. Importance of Visits to the United States by Officers

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had recently come to the United States for a thirty day visit. It was his first trip here. He was enthusiastic over what he had seen and learned and felt that this was one of the most important educational experiences of his life. He thought it would be a very useful thing from the point of view of both [REDACTED] and US interests, if other [REDACTED] could have a similar experience.

I recommend that this be given some study. Perhaps USIB might profitably discuss it.

V. Situation with Respect to [REDACTED]

1. The [REDACTED] consists [REDACTED] and a young man who handles all administrative matters starting with communications work. He is a fine boy who sticks closely to his support functions and whose [REDACTED] is elementary.

[REDACTED] handles the operational and substantive account not merely for the [REDACTED], not merely for the [REDACTED], but for the [REDACTED] which accounts for a third of the country's population, a half or more of its area, and a large share of its bitterest social and economic tension. If [REDACTED] extremists take over a state government or provoke disorders of civil war dimensions, they will almost certainly first do so [REDACTED] beat.

2 [REDACTED] is working himself to death. All of the difficulties of [REDACTED] are there and in bounty -- the water supply is of course dangerous, there is lots of sickness, one lives on the economy and buys his supplies in native street markets, the diet is tedious, there is no telephone and so on. The simple business of staying operational requires quite a little doing. Given the two points (a) the great

importance of [REDACTED] to the security of the country and, by extension, to all of Latin America, and (b) that the conditions of life reduce the effectiveness of a given body by at least 50%, I recommend that efforts be made to beef up [REDACTED] or reduce the size [REDACTED] beat by establishing other bases elsewhere in the northeast. I fully realize the difficulties one will encounter with the State Department in trying to put another of our men in a Consulate which is manned by probably fewer than half a dozen people.

VI. Possibility of Passing US Intelligence on the Situation in Cuba to [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expressed to our [REDACTED] an interest in bringing to the attention of [REDACTED] US information on the situation in Cuba. [REDACTED] I called on [REDACTED] and I informed him, speaking quite unofficially, that I was sure that President Kennedy would be delighted to have in the hands of [REDACTED] the same information on the situation in Cuba which he had. [REDACTED] seemed pleased at the prospect that we might deliver such material.

2. [REDACTED] I discussed this and agreed that we should try to put a series of short memoranda in [REDACTED] hands which would be deadpan statements on the size and composition of the Cuban military establishment, estimates of the stock of military supplies received from the Bloc, the nature of the Communist Government of Cuba, the scale and nature of its controls, its policy and activities with respect to education, the church, and labor. Later [REDACTED] I discussed the matter

fully with [REDACTED], told him I would endeavor to stir up the memos in question, urged him to be prepared to have them translated into [REDACTED] for passing to [REDACTED]

3. I brought this matter up at the Deputies' meeting on 24 May and got the Director's OK to proceed. I have been in touch with [REDACTED], Deputy Chief of WH Division, and [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] desk, DDP. The first memo is presently in train; it will be the easiest one to write because most of the materials are available in readily usable form. The others will require more work. If we push on with this project I most earnestly recommend that DDP tell off a man to assist in the preparation of these memos. DDI people should undertake to furnish the information in one form or another; the DDP man should be responsible for putting it in form for transmittal.